IPCO Annual Report 2018
closely the IPC is satisfied that it is precisely the depth of our inspections, and the access
to records given to IPCO Inspectors across all the organisations we oversee, which ensures
that the culture of self-reporting works as effectively as it does. There is little doubt that
unreported issues would emerge during the course of an inspection and so there is a
clear understanding amongst all public authorities that errors should be reported as soon
as possible.
17.6
The potential impact of errors on the rights of individuals can be grave. The prompt
identification of errors is key to ensuring that problems do not become systemic and that
individual failings are addressed. The onus is on the public authority to take the necessary
steps, with the agreement of, or as mandated by, the IPC to prevent recurrence. All public
authorities take errors seriously and the Inspectors keep a close check on remedial action
at follow-up inspections.
17.7
The IPC has a duty to inform affected parties of a serious error under section 231 of the
IPA, if he judges that this is in the public interest. A serious error is an instance of noncompliance which has resulted in significant prejudice or harm to the person concerned.
During 2018 the IPC made eight determinations in relation to serious errors, as detailed at
Annex C. In these cases, in accordance with section 231 (6) of the IPA, the Commissioner
informed the affected person of their right to apply to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal
(IPT) to seek redress.
Double lock error
17.8
The Home Office reported one instance where an administrative oversight meant that
judicial approval was not retrospectively sought in the case of an urgent application. This
was identified when the requesting agency sought to renew the warrant. The requesting
agency, when notified of the error by the Home Office, ceased all activity and cancelled the
original warrant, which had been active for five working days. The agency applied for a new
authorisation to cover the activity: the case, and the error, were briefed to both the Home
Secretary and a Judicial Commissioner (JC), who were satisfied that the requested action
was necessary and proportionate and who both approved the new application.
17.9
The Home Office took several steps to prevent repetitions of this error by changing the
process for handling urgent requests for warrants. We are confident that these processes
eliminate the possibility of inadvertently failing to validate urgent applications via the
double lock. We have seen no other instances where the double lock process has not been
effective.
UK Intelligence Community (UKIC) Errors
17.10
To allow comparisons with statistics provided in previous years, the errors from UKIC
and the Warrant Granting Departments (WGD) are broken down by agency and power
as inspected by the previous oversight organisations. UKIC reported a total of 167 errors.
Other than the Home Office error detailed above, there were no errors reported by the
WGDs or the Ministry of Defence (MOD).
17.11
Of the UKIC errors, 20 errors related to activity other than interception and
communications data (CD). There were 40 errors in this category reported in 2017 and 38
reported in 2016.
17.12
In addition, 40 interception errors and 107 CD related errors were reported by UKIC
agencies in 2018, as detailed below. Of the CD related errors, 46 were reportable errors.
105