IPCO Annual Report 2018
15.5
Our inspection at the NSU fell before the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (IPA) had been
fully implemented and so we did not formally inspect the modification casework in 2018.
However, our oversight via the double lock gives us a high level of confidence that these are
being well handled. In 2019, our inspectors will review a sample of modification paperwork
although, given the double lock, this is likely to be a lesser proportion than those reviewed
in house at each agency.
15.6
In our 2017 report, we stated concerns that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office
(FCO) in particular were not providing the expected level of oversight, or challenge, to
the UK Intelligence Community (UKIC) when reviewing and authorising submissions. The
introduction of the IPA, which has required significant resources from the FCO to manage
the new authorisation regime, has delayed our assurance work in this area. This transition
has included an overhaul of the department’s central records system for warrantry
and authorisations, which we expect to assist with our oversight in the future. We are
continuing to work with the FCO on this and anticipate that we will be in a position to
confirm a higher level of confidence in our 2019 Annual Report.
15.7
Our 2018 inspection of interception authorisations at the FCO noted good evidence that
the Foreign Secretary and Senior Officials were providing appropriate challenge to the
requesting agency. During this inspection, we scrutinised documented correspondence
between the FCO and requesting agency, which recorded examples of the FCO challenging
the scope and intrusiveness of proposed authorisations.
15.8
In addition, the introduction of the double lock has simultaneously established scrutiny of
authorisations that have been approved by the Foreign Secretary. We have no concerns
about the standard of scrutiny or challenge provided in those areas, specifically bulk
personal data (BPD), interception and equipment interference, and all subject to judicial
approval.
15.9
The WGDs of the Scottish Government (SG) and Northern Ireland Office (NIO) are providing
a robust guardian and gatekeeper function with regard to interception applications and
had a good level of compliance with the previous Regulation of Investigatory Powers 2000
(RIPA) regime and the Code of Practice.
15.10
We examined collateral intrusion statements made by Police Scotland and considered that
there could be greater consistency in some applications. We suggested that this was an
area the SG should focus on in the future.
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