IPCO Annual Report 2017
3. Covert Human Intelligence
Sources (CHIS)
Description of powers and use
3.1
Individuals act as a covert human intelligence sources (CHIS) if they i) establish or maintain a
relationship with another person to obtain information covertly, ii) give access to information
to another person, or iii) disclose information covertly which they have obtained using the
relationship or they have obtained because the relationship exists. The role of a CHIS also
includes undercover work such as using a public authority employee or a person holding
an office, rank or position in a law enforcement agency to act as an undercover officer (UC).
In practice, CHIS are used to tackle a huge variety of offences and to gather intelligence
in both the real and virtual world, from burglary and supplying drugs through to complex
investigations into human trafficking, child sexual exploitation and domestic and international
terrorism. If a law enforcement agency uses an undercover officer they are called a ‘relevant
source’ and additional oversight controls apply.
3.2
The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) Part II governs the use of CHIS by the
intelligence agencies, law enforcement agencies (LEAs) and other public authorities in the
UK. The Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Scotland) Act 2000 (RIP(S)A) governs the use
of CHIS by public authorities in Scotland. Outside the UK, s.7 of the Intelligence Services Act
1994 applies, and the activity is often referred to as agent running. The Secretary of State
approves all s.7 authorisations. Many public authorities conduct human intelligence source
activity online.1
3.3
Those public authorities that are entitled to authorise CHIS are detailed in Part 1 of Schedule
1 RIPA.2 These include police forces, law enforcement agencies such as the NCA, HMRC, the
intelligence services, the armed forces, other government departments, regulators such as
the Financial Conduct Authority and local authorities.
3.4
The intelligence and law enforcement agencies can use CHIS in fulfilling their statutory
functions, including preventing or detecting crime and protecting the interests of national
security. Other public authorities have a more limited range of statutory purposes available
to them, reflecting their more specific functions.3
3.5
Using CHIS powers presents considerable challenges to public authorities. They need
to consider carefully (i) the complex welfare and safety issues for the CHIS and his or her
family; (ii) the proportionality of the activity to be undertaken; (iii) managing the safety
1
2
3
The code of practice advises public authorities to seek RIPA authorisations where available under the act for any overseas operations
where the subject is a UK national or is likely to become the subject of criminal or civil proceedings in the UK, or if the operation is likely
to affect a UK national or give rise to material being used in evidence before a UK court.
All MOD human intelligence-source running currently takes place outside the UK and does not have a UK connection (as described in
the code of conduct). The MOD does not, therefore, require CHIS authorisations under RIPA but they choose to follow the guidance in
RIPA when authorising and conducting human intelligence source activity.
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/schedule/1
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2010/521/pdfs/uksi_20100521_en.pdf
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