Scale of use
5.8.
Neither MI5 nor MI6 conducts bulk interception, or envisages doing so, though
both use its intelligence product in their operations. For the foreseeable future,
all use of the interception power is likely therefore to be by GCHQ.
5.9.
We were told that just under half of all GCHQ intelligence reporting is based on
data obtained under bulk interception warrants.
For counter-terrorism
intelligence reporting, this figure rises to over half.
5.10.
It is said that to break these approximate figures down further would damage
national security by revealing too much about GCHQ’s capabilities. But I can
confirm that (as indicated at 5.5-5.6 above):
(a) each of the collection methods summarised at 2.19 above made a significant
contribution to GCHQ’s intelligence effort; and that
(b) the content of communications (and not simply secondary data) may be
crucial to identifying the intentions and plans of individuals. Six of the case
studies annexed to this Report involved the use of content (5.18 below), and
two thirds of GCHQ’s highest grate reporting from intercepted material is
based on content.199
5.11.
Having inspected a good number of intelligence reports and internal documents
(as to which, see further below), I have no doubt that the bulk interception power
continues to be used productively and on a large scale by GCHQ.
Case studies (Annex 8)200
5.12.
At the Review team’s principal meeting with GCHQ, we were provided with
details of nine case studies relating to bulk interception, (A8/1,3-10). We were
able to view underlying contemporary documents in relation to those case
studies, and to question analysts and managers with knowledge of those
operations. Subsequently, the Review team was provided with a further four
case studies (A8/2,11-13). The Review team did not have the opportunity to
discuss these case studies with those involved in the operations, nor to view
documents relating to them. I had, though, been given details of two of these
199
200
GCHQ’s highest-grade reporting contains intelligence that could change UK government policy,
fill in details of a threat to life situation or provide highly important operational information, such
as that which might keep an agent safe. To meet this threshold, it is usually the meaning of
the communication rather than the fact of its existence that would provide the crucial
intelligence.
For convenience I refer (for example) to Case Study 5 in Annex 8 to this Report as A8/5.
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