each of the four powers under review by security-cleared bodies and individuals
as follows:
(a) as to bulk interception, by the IOCC (3.9-3.11 above) and the ISC (3.253.26 above);
(b) as to bulk acquisition, by the IOCC (3.12-3.13 above) and in some respects
by the IsComm (3.21 above);
(c) as to bulk EI, by the Chair of the ISC, apparently on behalf of other ISC
members (3.36 above);185 and
(d) as to BPDs, by successive IsComms (3.16-3.19) and the ISC (3.32 above).
185
3.88.
The IPT has looked or is looking at all four of the powers under review, but has
not so far been called upon to assess the strength of the operational case or to
decide whether equivalent results could have been reached by other means.
3.89.
Of further relevance are the assessments of the PCLOB in the US (3.43-3.65
above), of the US National Academy of Sciences (3.66-3.71) and of the
intelligence professionals who debated the issue in evidence before the Joint Bill
Committee and Public Bill Committee (3.72-3.7 above). Despite the contrary
opinion of William Binney, I find these assessments to be supportive of the utility
of bulk interception, and of little relevance to the bulk acquisition power because
of the significant differences between that power and the s215 power in the US.
The ISC also noted the utility of EI, without specific reference to bulk: 3.29, 3.33 above.
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