300 seed numbers”.158 In 2015, by contrast, MI5 made 20,042 applications
to access communications data obtained pursuant to s94 directions, relating
to 122,579 items of communications data, and GCHQ identified 141,251
communications addresses or identifiers of interest from such
communications data, which directly contributed to an intelligence report.159
That is despite the fact that data under s215 was retained for five years, as
against 12 months under the UK power.
Utility of the s215 programme
3.52.
The PCLOB found that, as a matter of US law, the telephone records program
did not have an adequate basis in s215 and that it also raised constitutional
concerns. But of greater relevance to this Review is the PCLOB’s finding that
the program had “shown minimal value in safeguarding the nation from
terrorism”. It summarised its conclusions as follows:
“Based on the information provided to the Board, including classified briefings
and documentation, we have not identified a single instance involving a threat
to the United States in which the program made a concrete difference in the
outcome of a counterterrorism investigation. Moreover we are aware of no
instance in which the program directly contributed to the discovery of a
previously unknown terrorist plot or the disruption of a terrorist attack. And
we believe that in only one instance over the past seven years has the
program arguably contributed to the identification of an unknown terrorist
suspect. Even in that case, the suspect was not involved in planning a
terrorist attack and there is no reason to believe that the FBI may have
discovered him without the contribution of the NSA’s program.
The Board’s review suggests that where the telephone records collected by
the NSA under its s215 program have provided value, they have done so
primarily in two ways: by offering additional leads regarding the contacts of
terrorism suspects already known to investigators, and by demonstrating that
foreign terrorist plots do not have a US nexus. The former can help
investigators confirm suspicions about the target of an inquiry or about
persons in contact with that target. The latter can help the intelligence
community focus its limited investigatory resources by avoiding false leads
and channelling efforts where they are needed most. But with respect to the
former, our review suggests that the Section 215 program offers little unique
value but largely duplicates the FBI’s own information gathering efforts. And
with respect to the latter, while the value of proper resource allocation in timesensitive situations is not to be discounted, we question whether the
American public should accept the government’s routine collection of all of its
158
159
PCLOB section 215 report, p.30.
IOCCO July 2016 report, 8.62 and 8.70.
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