swiftly to a COBR meeting and the Prime Minister authorised a rescue attempt by UK
military forces. The hostages were subsequently successfully rescued.
In this case, the Review team is unaware of any likely alternative method to bulk
interception through which the hostage-takers could have been identified and located, or
their intentions revealed, sufficiently swiftly to ensure the safety of the hostages.
GCHQ managers explained to the Review team that they would not be able to respond
to the majority of hostage cases without bulk interception. In most cases (as in this
example), GCHQ has to start from scratch, with no existing intelligence to assist. The
use of bulk interception is the only means to achieve the quick results that are needed in
hostage situations.
Case study A8/7
GCHQ
Action
Support of military operations
During the Afghanistan campaign, Camp Bastion in southern Afghanistan was the main
base for UK military forces. It was considered a top target by the Taleban who
continually made attempts to attack the base and those within it.
As part of its support to military operations and force protection, GCHQ used analysis of
secondary data obtained under bulk interception warrants to identify mobile devices in
the area of Camp Bastion; where those devices were in contact with known insurgents,
GCHQ then prioritised the devices for further analysis. It quickly became clear from
subsequent bulk interception that what had been uncovered was extensive planning
involving multiple insurgents.
Bulk interception gave GCHQ access to the content of the insurgents’ communications;
this led to the identification of further members of the group and to the discovery of
details of attack planning, including a plan to mount a co-ordinated attack against Camp
Bastion. The information was passed to those responsible for security at the Camp and
enabled British forces to disrupt several planned attacks.
This support to the UK military would not have been possible without the use of both
secondary data and content obtained under bulk interception warrants. In circumstances
like those in Afghanistan at this time, there was no practical means to obtain
communications on a purely targeted basis; the only way to obtain communications was
to piece them together from the global communications network under a bulk authority.
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