9.28.
The TAP should have a public profile, perhaps through the IPC rather than a
secretariat of its own. The identity of its members would therefore need to be
disclosed. It should be encouraged to involve industry, academia and civil
liberties organisations in seminars and discussions, and should be fully aware of
international developments.
9.29.
The TAP would not sit on a permanent basis but could meet several times in a
year. So as to focus minds, I would suggest a mandatory annual report to the
IPC, furnished also to the Secretary of State, which could be preceded or
followed by oral discussions or evidence sessions so as to aid understanding.
Other work could be tasked by the IPC as necessary. A full version of the TAP’s
reports could probably not be made public, but should the ISC require to see
them in connection with its own work, access should be granted. The TAP would
however remain accountable to the IPC rather than the ISC or the Secretary of
State.
9.30.
I have been strengthened in my resolve to make this recommendation by
learning of the existence (not publicly disclosed until now) of the Scientific
Advisory Committees, or SACs, that give external advice to, respectively,
MI5/MI6 and GCHQ.261 Those bodies contain among their members precisely
the blend of independent academics and industry experts that it would be
desirable to have on the TAP. Subject to avoiding any possible conflicts of
interest, the Chief Judicial Commissioner might choose to recruit past or current
members of the SACs to serve on the TAP. I was able to discuss the idea with
the current Chair of one of the SACs, whose preliminary reaction was positive.
9.31.
The point of the TAP would not be to provide an alternative oversight function, or
to place new regulatory burdens on the SIAs. Rather, it would serve to inform
the Secretary of State, and enhance the work of the IPC, by ensuring that both
are kept as up to date as possible with the fast-moving technologies whose use
they are asked to approve (and, in the case of the IPC, to audit).
9.32.
261
This Report has declared the powers under review to have a clear operational
purpose. But like an old-fashioned snapshot, it will fade in time. The world is
changing with great speed, and new questions will arise about the exercise,
utility and intrusiveness of these strong capabilities.
If adopted, my
recommendation will enable such questions to be answered by a strong
oversight body on a properly informed basis.
See 1.42 above.
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