9.24.
Helpfully, the Government has already promised that the IPC will have
“significantly greater resources, including technical and legal resources, to
ensure that they can effectively hold the intelligence agencies and law
enforcement to account”.259
In-house technical resources will plainly be required. But expertise of the kind I
have identified will not be easily bought in, for two reasons. First, it requires the
expert knowledge and foresight of people who are right at the cutting edge.
Secondly, it requires a close understanding of the SIAs’ technical and
operational systems, plans and ambitions: knowledge which for obvious reasons
is very closely held.
The Technology Advisory Panel
9.25.
The solution as it seems to me is to provide for a small panel of technology
experts – the Technology Advisory Panel [TAP]260 – with very high security
clearance, appointed by and reporting to the independent IPC, to support both
the IPC and the Secretary of State. The TAP would not be involved in the
consideration of warrant applications, but would advise in particular on the
technological issues identified above. I see no reason to restrict its range to the
four bulk powers which are the subject of this Review.
9.26.
Those experts should not be employed by Government or by the SIAs, or have
contracts with the SIAs. They should be people who are capable of probing the
SIAs, explaining difficult concepts to lay decision-makers, and generally
contributing to the culture of robust challenge that will be essential to the
effective operation of the IPC. I envisage a mixture of independent academics
and individuals with substantial, current experience of industry. I would not
disqualify those with a past connection with the SIAs from membership: indeed a
degree of understanding of SIA systems and organisation would be of real utility
in focusing the work of the TAP where it could be most useful.
9.27.
I have considered whether to recommend that one or more moral philosophers
submit to vetting for the purpose of serving on the TAP, on the model of the
policing panel IDEPP (1.52 above) which I understand has expertise of this kind.
The possibility need not be ruled out. But though reflection on the ethical
framework for the exercise of investigatory powers can only be desirable, it
seems to me that the Judicial Commissioners are in a good position to provide
leadership in this area by other means, should they choose to do it, and that the
technological expertise of the TAP should not be unduly diluted.
259
260
“Factsheet – Investigatory Powers Commission”, published with the draft Bill in November
2015.
Not to be confused with the Technical Advisory Board (clause 220), which has a very different
function.
127