The Bill should be amended to provide for a Technology Advisory
Panel, appointed by and reporting to the IPC, to advise the IPC and the
Secretary of State on the impact of changing technology on the exercise
of investigatory powers and on the availability and development of
techniques to use those powers while minimising interference with
privacy.
I explain my reasoning below.
The impact of changing technology
9.19.
It has been apparent to me during the conduct of the Review that though I am
clear about the utility (or in the case of bulk EI, potentially utility) of the bulk
powers, nothing in this field stays still forever, or even for long. Those
authorising, approving and monitoring the exercise of bulk powers need to be
alert to technological changes, and their consequences both for the utility of the
powers and for the impact of their exercise on individuals.
9.20.
To take just a few examples of technological issues that could or should affect
the future use of bulk powers (which I offer as theoretical possibilities rather than
predictions):
(a) The continuing trend towards universal encryption and anonymisation of
devices could reduce the utility of the bulk interception power, or aspects of it
(5.55 above).
(b) The future development of a fully-functioning request filter might reduce the
operational advantage that the bulk acquisition power currently enjoys over
the DRIPA power (6.26-6.28 above).
(c) New techniques for bulk EI will be developed, some of which may disappoint,
or show themselves capable of causing unintended damage to devices, and
all of which will need to be properly understood by those responsible for
authorising them (7.24-7.25 above).
(d) The “additional promise” of new techniques for making use of bulk data
holdings may bring with it additional threats to the privacy of those whose
data is held (8.31(d) above).
The Review was also told by a distinguished independent scientist that the ability
to share databases across multiple sites by distributed ledger technology is likely
to have its own, perhaps far-reaching, consequences for the exercise of
investigatory powers.
256
See also the points made at 2.84 above and fn 257 below.
125