expressed by others who have looked at these issues on a security-cleared
basis. My conclusions, and my reasoning to the extent that I have been able to
explain it, are now open for discussion and debate. I hope that they will help to
inform what remains of the parliamentary consideration of the Bill.
The strength of the operational case
9.12.
I have already summarised what I consider to be the strength of the operational
case for each of the bulk powers (chapters 5-8 above). Among the other
sources of evidence referred to in chapter 4 above, I have based my conclusions
on the analysis of some 60 case studies, as well as on internal documents in
which the SIAs offered frank and unvarnished assessments of the utility and
limitations of the powers under review.
9.13.
The sheer vivid range of the case studies – ranging from the identification of
dangerous terrorists to the protection of children from sexual abuse, the defence
of companies from cyber-attack and hostage rescues in Afghanistan –
demonstrates the remarkable variety of SIA activity. Having observed practical
demonstrations, questioned a large number of analysts and checked what they
said against contemporaneous intelligence reports, neither I nor others on the
Review team was left in any doubt as to the important part played by the existing
bulk powers in identifying, understanding and averting threats of a national
security and/or serious criminal nature, whether in Great Britain, Northern Ireland
or further afield.
9.14.
My specific conclusions, in short summary, are as follows:
(a) The bulk interception power is of vital utility across the range of GCHQ’s
operational areas, including counter-terrorism, cyber-defence, child sexual
exploitation, organised crime and the support of military operations. The
Review team was satisfied that it has played an important part in the
prevention of bomb attacks, the rescuing of hostages and the thwarting of
numerous cyber-attacks. Both the major processes described at 2.19 above
produce valuable results. Communications data is used more frequently, but
the collection and analysis of content has produced extremely high-value
intelligence, sometimes in crucial situations. Just under 50% of GCHQ’s
intelligence reporting is based on data obtained under bulk interception
warrants, rising to over 50% in the field of counter-terrorism.251
(b) The bulk acquisition power, undisclosed until November 2015 and used by
MI5 and GCHQ, has similarities with the DRIPA power but has two significant
advantages: ability to perform complex analysis and greater speed of use.
251
See chapter 5 above, in particular 5.8-5.10 and 5.50-5.55.
122