37. Two errors occurred at the Home Office. The first occurred when the
Home Office received a request to cancel a warrant when in fact the agency
concerned only required certain addresses to be deleted from the schedule by
modification deletion. The warrant had two other live schedules in operation
for other communications service providers (CSPs). Home Office checks
should have shown that the warrant had these other extant lines but due to
human error this was overlooked. Therefore although the warrant was
cancelled the address remained active with the other CSPs. When it was
established that a cancellation instrument had been signed erroneously as a
result of the requesting agency’s letter being misinterpreted at the Home Office
all interception with the CSPs was suspended and the agency instructed to
apply for a new warrant against the target.
38. The second error related to a mobile telephone number added to an
existing warrant under the urgent procedures. Although the intercepting
agency sent the ratification to the Home Office before its expiry date, Home
Office officials failed to have the ratification signed by a senior official before
the expiry date. Once the error was noticed by the Home Office the intercept
was immediately suspended until a new modification was added to the warrant.
Whilst I understand the difficulties that may be encountered by the
intercepting agencies and warrant-issuing departments, particularly during a
holiday period, I do consider it unsatisfactory that an error should occur as a
result of an urgent modification expiring before it is signed.
39. One error was reported by the Scottish Executive although the fault for
the error lies, not with them, but with a Scottish police force. The police force
sought, and obtained, from the Scottish Executive a warrant, which was signed
on 8 August 2002. By 13 August 2002 it became apparent that the intercept was
not producing any intelligence. It transpired that the telephone number on the
interception warrant was incorrect by one digit. Investigations revealed that the
intelligence records in respect of the target showed the correct telephone
number but that a mistake occurred within the police force when the number
was transcribed into the warrant application form to the Scottish Executive.
40. The Northern Ireland Office reported an error in a warrant signed by the
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland although the error itself occurred in the
paperwork presented to Northern Ireland Office officials by the mainland
police force seeking the warrant. Investigations revealed that a police officer in
the mainland force incorrectly transferred details of the target’s telephone
number from his written notes to the warrant application form; two digits in the
communications address became transposed. Unfortunately, due to the urgent
nature of the application it was submitted, via NCIS, with the error intact.
41. Seven errors were reported by GCHQ of which three are highlighted
below. In the first case the intercept product revealed that the user was no
longer the target but a new subscriber. An immediate subscriber check with the
CSP confirmed that the user had indeed changed and the intercept was
immediately ceased. The error occurred as a result of a reallocation of the
telephone number. GCHQ’s discussions with various CSPs highlighted the
short term difficulties that the network providers had in tracking the
reallocation of numbers within their customer databases.
42. The second error occurred as a result of a typing error within GCHQ. A
modification was made to an existing GCHQ warrant and once the signature
had been confirmed, the CSP were e-mailed with instructions to provide
intercept of the relevant telephone numbers. Unfortunately, the member of
staff at GCHQ who sent the e-mail mistyped three of the digits. When the CSP
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