BIG BROTHER WATCH AND OTHERS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
their own systems (see paragraph 180 above). In such cases, the interception
of the material by the United Kingdom intelligence services would have
been conducted in accordance with domestic law including, in so far as is
relevant in the present case, section 8(4) of RIPA. According to
paragraph 7.5 of the IC Code, where intercept material was disclosed to the
authorities of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom, the
intelligence services had to take reasonable steps to ensure that the
authorities in question had and would maintain the necessary procedures to
safeguard the intercept material, and to ensure that it was disclosed, copied,
distributed and retained only to the minimum extent necessary. The
intercept material could not be further disclosed to the authorities of a third
country or territory unless explicitly agreed with the issuing agency and it
had to be returned to the issuing agency or securely destroyed when no
longer needed (see paragraph 96 above). Section 15(7) of RIPA further
provided that restrictions should be in force which would prevent the doing
of anything in connection with legal proceedings outside the United
Kingdom which would disclose the content or related communications data
of an intercepted communication where such a disclosure could not have
been made in the United Kingdom (see paragraph 82 above).
397. In respect of confidential material, paragraph 4.30 of the IC Code
provided that where confidential information was disseminated to an outside
body, reasonable steps had to be taken to mark the information as
confidential. Where there was any doubt as to the lawfulness of the
proposed dissemination of confidential information, advice had to be sought
from a legal adviser within the relevant intercepting agency and before any
further dissemination of the material could take place (see paragraph 96
above).
398. There were therefore safeguards in place to ensure that intelligence
partners would guarantee the secure storage of transferred material and
restrict its onward disclosure. A final safeguard, to which the Court attaches
particular weight, is the oversight provided by the IC Commissioner and the
IPT (see paragraphs 411 and 414 below).
399. In light of the foregoing, the Court considers that the precautions to
be taken when communicating intercept material to other parties were
sufficiently clear and afforded sufficiently robust guarantees against abuse.
‒ 6. The limits on the duration of interception, the storage of intercept
material and the circumstances in which such material must be erased or
destroyed
400. As regards the duration of section 8(4) warrants issued for reasons
of national security or the economic well-being of the United Kingdom so
far as those interests were also relevant to the interests of national security,
pursuant to section 9 of RIPA these ceased to have effect after six months,
unless they were renewed. Section 8(4) warrants issued by the Secretary of
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