BIG BROTHER WATCH AND OTHERS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
above). Any subsequent access by the analyst was limited to a defined
period of time, and if that period of time was renewed, the record had to be
updated giving reasons for renewal (see paragraph 7.17 of the IC Code, at
paragraph 96 above). According to paragraph 7.18 of the IC Code, regular
audits were carried out which included checks to ensure that the records
requesting access to material were compiled correctly, and that the material
requested fell within the matters certified by the Secretary of State (see
paragraph 96 above).
389. Furthermore, according to paragraph 7.15, material gathered under
a section 8(4) warrant could only be read, looked at or listened to by
authorised persons (analysts) who had received regular mandatory training
regarding the provisions of RIPA and the requirements of necessity and
proportionality, and who had been appropriately vetted (see paragraph 96
above). Pursuant to paragraph 7.10, the vetting of each individual member
of staff was periodically reviewed (see paragraph 96 above).
390. Paragraph 7.6 of the IC Code provided that intercept material could
only be copied to the extent necessary for the authorised purposes and
subject to a strict application of the “need to know” principle, including
providing extracts or summaries where this was sufficient to satisfy the
user’s need to know. Section 15(5) of RIPA required arrangements to be in
place for securing that every copy of the material or data that was made was
stored, for as long as it was retained, in a secure manner (see paragraph 81
above); and paragraph 7.7 further required that prior to its destruction,
intercept material, and all copies, extracts and summaries of it, had to be
stored securely and could not be accessible to persons without the required
level of security clearance (see paragraph 96 above).
391. Subject to the aforementioned deficiencies relating to the
authorisation of the selectors (see paragraphs 381 and 382 above) and the
general nature of the Secretary of State’s certificate (see paragraph 386
above), the Court considers that the circumstances in which intercept
material could be selected, examined, used and stored under the section 8(4)
regime were sufficiently “foreseeable” for the purposes of Article 8 of the
Convention, and that they provided adequate safeguards against abuse.
‒ 5. The precautions to be taken when communicating the material to other
parties
392. Section 15(2) of RIPA required that the following be limited to the
minimum necessary for the “authorised purposes”: the number of persons to
whom the material or data were disclosed or made available; the extent to
which the material or data were disclosed or made available; the extent to
which the material or data were copied; and the number of copies that were
made (see paragraphs 78 above). Pursuant to section 15(4) and paragraph
7.2 of the IC Code, something was necessary for the authorised purposes if,
and only if, it continued to be, or was likely to become, necessary for the
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