BIG BROTHER WATCH AND OTHERS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT
Court has indicated that it is of fundamental importance for at least the
categories of selectors to be identified in the authorisation and for those
strong selectors linked to identifiable individuals to be subject to prior
internal authorisation providing for separate and objective verification of
whether the justification conforms to the aforementioned principles (see
paragraphs 353-355 above).
383. In the present case, the absence of any oversight of the categories
of selectors at the point of authorisation was a deficiency in the section 8(4)
regime. Neither did the subsequent control of all individual selectors satisfy
the requirement for enhanced safeguards for the use of strong selectors
linked to identifiable individuals and the need to have in place a process of
prior internal authorisation providing for separate and objective verification
of whether the justification conforms to the above mentioned principles (see
paragraph 355 above). Although analysts had to record and justify the use of
every selector with regard to the Convention principles of necessity and
proportionality and that justification was subjected to independent
supervision by the IC Commissioner, strong selectors linked to identifiable
individuals were nevertheless not subject to prior internal authorisation.
‒ 4. The procedures to be followed for selecting, examining, and using
intercept material
384. Paragraph 6.4 of the IC Code stipulated that where a section 8(4)
warrant resulted in the acquisition of large volumes of communications,
authorised persons within the intercepting agency could apply strong
selectors and complex queries to generate an index (see paragraph 96
above). This selection process was circumscribed by section 16(2) of RIPA
and paragraph 7.19 of the IC Code, which provided that a selector could not
refer to an individual known to be in the British Islands, and have as a
purpose the identification of material contained in communications sent by
or intended for him or her, unless the Secretary of State had personally
authorised the use of the selector, having first been satisfied that it was
necessary in the interests of national security, for the purpose of preventing
or detecting serious crime, or for the purpose of safeguarding the economic
well-being of the United Kingdom so far as those interests were also
relevant to the interests of national security; and was proportionate (see
paragraphs 85 and 96 above).
385. Only material on the index could be viewed by an analyst (see
paragraphs 96 and 289 above); and no intelligence report could be made of
any communications or communications data unless they had been viewed
by an analyst (see paragraph 289 above). Moreover, paragraph 7.13 of the
IC Code provided that only material described in the Secretary of State’s
certificate was available for human examination, and no official was
permitted to gain access to the material other than as permitted by the
certificate (see paragraph 96 above). Paragraph 6.4 further provided that
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