state but also determines the essential features of the state's relationship to the community of states. In this respect, the Basic Law assumes that delimitation and cooperation between states and legal systems is necessary (cf. BVerfGE 100, 313 <362>).
These intergovernmental relations restrict applicant no. 1’s margin of assessment
and its latitude of action; due to international treaties and agreements it lacks exclusive power of disposal over the NSA Selector Lists. In this regard, the exercise of
sovereign authority in foreign affairs differs from that exercised in purely domestic affairs.
b) Moreover, in the case at hand there is no risk of creating a vacuum that is exempt
from any oversight, which would accordingly result a complete exclusion of Parliament from any kind of information. It was not the case that the circumstances of the
intelligence cooperation between NSA and BND in the course of the project of the
Joint SIGINT Activity were withheld from the Committee of Inquiry entirely. Rather,
the respondents, in cooperating with the Committee of Inquiry, responded to the relevant request through other procedural means and in as precise a manner as possible
without actually disclosing secrets.
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The respondents provided the Committee of Inquiry with information on the focus areas of the cooperation between BND and NSA, the contents and the composition of
the selectors, the filtering of selectors on the part of the BND as well as on the number
of rejected selectors. They submitted, inter alia, a written testimony of the BND on its
findings relating to the NSA Selector Lists.
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Furthermore, respondent no. 1 proposed to the Committee of Inquiry that an expert
in a position of trust be appointed and tasked with analysing the NSA Selector Lists
who would then report back on the findings to the Committee of Inquiry. The Committee found this proposal to be reasonable (Committee document, Ausschussdrucksache 385, clause 1) and hence appointed the responsible person of trust as expert.
The Committee of Inquiry compiled a questionnaire (Committee document 385,
clause 5) and in consultation with the expert agreed on criteria, key issues and questions for the report. Even in the non-classified version, the report submitted by the expert in a position of trust provides a basis for assessing the nature and the scope of
the intelligence services’ cooperation and for reviewing violations of German interests
and of German law. The report comprises statistical analyses and was drafted in as
specific a manner as possible. The analysis of the Selector Lists comprises a description of selector types, the technical structure of selectors and their permutations, as
well as the number of rejected selectors in conjunction with abstract designations of
the relevant targets, such as German embassies abroad, government institutions and
state agencies in EU Member States, institutions of the EU, members of European
governments as well as their respective staff, and members of [their] parliaments. As
regards the specific designation, i.e. the mentioning by name of the natural and legal
persons as well as institutions or governmental facilities that are affected as targets of
intelligence activities, it can be held that having knowledge of such facts is more a
matter of general and political interest. However, as far as the Committee of Inquiry’s
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