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primary interest in protecting the essential functions of the State and the fundamental interests of
society and encompasses the prevention and punishment of activities capable of seriously
destabilising the fundamental constitutional, political, economic or social structures of a country
and, in particular, of directly threatening society, the population or the State itself, such as terrorist
activities.
136
The importance of the objective of safeguarding national security, read in the light of Article 4(2)
TEU, goes beyond that of the other objectives referred to in Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58,
inter alia the objectives of combating crime in general, even serious crime, and of safeguarding
public security. Threats such as those referred to in the preceding paragraph can be distinguished,
by their nature and particular seriousness, from the general risk that tensions or disturbances, even
of a serious nature, affecting public security will arise. Subject to meeting the other requirements
laid down in Article 52(1) of the Charter, the objective of safeguarding national security is therefore
capable of justifying measures entailing more serious interferences with fundamental rights than
those which might be justified by those other objectives.
137
Thus, in situations such as those described in paragraphs 135 and 136 of the present judgment,
Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58, read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the
Charter, does not, in principle, preclude a legislative measure which permits the competent
authorities to order providers of electronic communications services to retain traffic and location
data of all users of electronic communications systems for a limited period of time, as long as there
are sufficiently solid grounds for considering that the Member State concerned is confronted with a
serious threat, as referred to in paragraphs 135 and 136 of the present judgment, to national security
which is shown to be genuine and present or foreseeable. Even if such a measure is applied
indiscriminately to all users of electronic communications systems, without there being at first sight
any connection, within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 133 of the present judgment,
with a threat to the national security of that Member State, it must nevertheless be considered that
the existence of that threat is, in itself, capable of establishing that connection.
138
The instruction for the preventive retention of data of all users of electronic communications
systems must, however, be limited in time to what is strictly necessary. Although it is conceivable
that an instruction requiring providers of electronic communications services to retain data may,
owing to the ongoing nature of such a threat, be renewed, the duration of each instruction cannot
exceed a foreseeable period of time. Moreover, such data retention must be subject to limitations
and must be circumscribed by strict safeguards making it possible to protect effectively the personal
data of the persons concerned against the risk of abuse. Thus, that retention cannot be systematic in
nature.
139
In view of the seriousness of the interference with the fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 7
and 8 of the Charter resulting from a measure involving the general and indiscriminate retention of
data, it must be ensured that recourse to such a measure is in fact limited to situations in which there
is a serious threat to national security as referred to in paragraphs 135 and 136 of the present
judgment. For that purpose, it is essential that decisions giving an instruction to providers of
electronic communications services to carry out such data retention be subject to effective review,
either by a court or by an independent administrative body whose decision is binding, the aim of
that review being to verify that one of those situations exists and that the conditions and safeguards
which must be laid down are observed.
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Legislative measures providing for the preventive retention of traffic and location data for the
purposes of combating crime and safeguarding public security
140
As regards the objective of preventing, investigating, detecting and prosecuting criminal offences,
in accordance with the principle of proportionality, only action to combat serious crime and
measures to prevent serious threats to public security are capable of justifying serious interference
with the fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter, such as the interference
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