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IPCO Annual Report 2017
14.18
The remaining 7 interception errors did not relate to the authorisation or implementation
of interception warrants. They were instead either caused by CSPs providing police forces or
intelligence agencies with the content of communications when only communications data
had been requested under Chapter 2 of Part 1 of RIPA; or as a result of a contravention of
section 1(5) of RIPA, for example, when a police force did not have the necessary authority
or consent to access stored communications.
14.19
The vast majority of the errors under this heading fell into six distinct categories, as
exemplified below:
a. Over-collection
This generally relates to a software or hardware malfunction that results in the
over‑collection of intercepted material and related communications data. Errors in
this category can be markedly varied, including as to the quantities of personal data
collected. These errors have the potential to be highly complex and may take a number
of months to investigate. The cause is almost invariably identified and satisfactorily
resolved. A significant amount of work is usually undertaken to implement measures to
prevent any recurrence, and this may include periodic sampling and other regular checks
to increase the agency’s ability to monitor and detect such errors. We stress that in all
cases, steps are taken immediately to ensure that the erroneously collected material and
data is deleted.
b. The interception of an incorrect communications address
The majority of these errors were human in nature although a small number were due
to a failure of technical systems to update correctly. For example, these may be the
result of an error in the transposition of a mobile telephone number, either by a member
of staff at the interception agency or the CSP.
c. The unauthorised selection and examination of intercepted material
The most common errors in this category were, first, instances when an analyst mistakenly
continued to select the communications of an individual who was thought to be based
overseas after he or she had returned to the United Kingdom, and, second, when a
technical mishap caused the selection of incorrect material.
d. The incorrect dissemination or misrouting of intercepted material
These errors, which constitute non-compliance with section 15(2) of RIPA, are mainly
caused by the misdirection of intercepted material (and any related communications data)
to the wrong interception agency. In all the cases examined, the interception was correctly
authorised, the mistake was immediately identified by the (wrong) receiving agency and
the material and data was deleted.
e. The failure to cancel an interception
These errors were in the main caused by staff within the interception agency, the warrant
granting department or the CSP failing promptly or properly to effect the cancellation.
f. The interception of the wrong individual
Whilst these errors bear similarity to those described in category b) above, they represent
instances when the interception agency has obtained a warrant and material relating to
the wrong person has been intercepted, because (i) of technical reasons, (ii) the telephone
was the property of someone not covered by the warrant, or (iii) the telephone was in
the possession of someone not covered by the warrant. Generally in this situation, the
correct communications address is set out on the warrant but the subject of interest is