IPCO Annual Report 2017
• Breaches are most frequently the result of a simple human mistake. The examples
are numerous and include installing equipment or starting the surveillance before
the authorisation is in place or continuing the activity or leaving the equipment in situ
after the authorisation has been cancelled. The steps taken by the authority in these
circumstances generally – indeed, almost invariably – are reassuring: the error is
reported and any material obtained as a result of unauthorised activity is handled with
appropriate care, including its destruction.
14.14
It will be apparent from the analysis above that many errors are readily avoidable if greater
attention is paid to the detail of the relevant circumstances. By way of example, a careful
check by the officer on the relevant systems, or other straightforward enquiry, to ensure
the authorisation is in place and the undertaking is otherwise lawful, or a timely notification
is given to the relevant personnel that the activity is to be terminated and the equipment
removed or switched off. Errors are not confined to inexperienced officers or teams. Whilst
it is understandable that mistakes as to documentation and processes are made on occasion
in the ‘heat’ of an investigation, it is far more difficult to excuse errors that are repeated,
particularly those that reveal a systemic problem.
14.15
The fault is sometimes the result of a failure to include key details in the authorisation
documentation, such as a proper description of the subjects, vehicles or locations. This can
be particularly acute with longer-running operations involving organised crime groups, when
there can be a premium on keeping track of the relevant people, vehicles and places that are
the subject of the covert activity. The success of a fast-moving and time-critical operation
can depend on this understanding. Many of the incidents reported last year would not have
arisen with improved attention to detail by those seeking, authorising and undertaking the
relevant activity.
Oversight of the powers covered by the Interception of Communications
Commissioner (Interception and acquisition of communications data by
all public authorities)
Interception
14.16
In addition to the assistance which we hope is provided by setting out our generalised
findings and recommendations (see above), the IPC has a particular duty under s.58(2)
and (3) of RIPA 2000 to report any contravention of the provisions of the legislation, or
any inadequate discharge of the s.15 safeguards, to the Prime Minister. Error reporting is
an important part of IPCO’s oversight regime, aiding accountability and enhancing public
confidence. It is vital to achieve a consistent approach from all the interception agencies
as to the thresholds, approach and reporting criterion that they utilise for errors.
14.17
During 2017, there were 66 interception errors reported to IOCCO and IPCO. Whilst this
represents a marked decrease on the number of errors reported in 2016 (108), the figure
is more in line with 2015. 59 of the errors related to the authorisation or administration of
an interception warrant. 51 were by the interception agencies, one by a warrant granting
department and 7 by Communication Service Providers (CSPs) when giving effect to
interception warrants.
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