IPCO Annual Report 2017
Oversight of the powers covered by the Office of Surveillance
Commissioners (Non-intelligence agency surveillance and CHIS)
14.7
The OSC was, until the end of August 2017, responsible for oversight of certain covert
activities by public authorities (with the exception of the intelligence services) that could
carry out the following activities: directed surveillance, intrusive surveillance, property
interference, covert human intelligence sources (CHIS) including undercover activity, and
encryption (Parts II and III of RIPA, Sections 6 and 7 of RIP(S)A, and Part 3 of the Police Act
1997). The OSC’s remit covered the United Kingdom and the Sovereign Base Area of Cyprus
(in the latter instance, in accordance with a Regulation of Investigatory Powers Ordinance).
14.8
There was no formal definition of error provided by the OSC, but the Chief Surveillance
Commissioner expected to be provided with a report by any public authority when it realised,
or suspected, that it had been ‘in breach’ of the statutory requirements, or had failed to
comply with the procedures established by the OSC in order to fulfil its prior approval role.
The following section of the OSC’s Procedures & Guidance document advised how this was
to be managed:
“All covert activity that is not properly authorised should be reported as soon as it is
recognised. Activity which should properly be authorised but which isn’t should be reported
to the Chief Surveillance Commissioner, in writing, as soon as the error is recognised. An
initial email alerting the OSC should be followed by a report detailing the circumstances
and remedial action submitted by the Chief Officer or Senior Responsible Officer.
This does not apply to covert activity which is deliberately not authorised because an
Authorising Officer considers that it does not meet the legislative criteria, but allows it
to continue. It does include activity which should have been authorised but wasn’t or
which was conducted outwith the directions provided by an Authorising Officer. All activity
which should have been authorised but was not should be recorded and reported to the
Inspector(s) at the commencement of an inspection to confirm that any direction provided
by the Chief Surveillance Commissioner has been followed.”
14.9
In the main, public authorities have responsibly reported breaches at an early stage, very
often by way of a brief email with the promise of a detailed letter and report to follow.
There is sometimes a noticeable gap before those latter documents arrive but the delay is
usually the result of the internal investigation into the circumstances and the time needed
to formulate proposals for remedial action.
14.10
It has been clear for many years that authorities take errors or breaches seriously, and they
are almost invariably met with a robust and thorough response. There is a strong culture of
reliable ‘self‑reporting’.
14.11
83 breaches under this heading were reported to the OSC and IPCO during 2017 in relation
to surveillance, property interference and CHIS. This is a slight reduction from 2016-17.
91