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IPCO Annual Report 2017
CHIS standards
11.17
Sir Mark Wailer recommended that SIS improves its record keeping as to how the principles
of the RIPA code of practice are applied to overseas agent running (CHIS). We requested and
received several briefings about SIS’s overseas CHIS activities, which have provided some initial
insight as to how these operations are conducted. It is clear that the key issues in this context
are considered, such as necessity and proportionality, intrusion into privacy, the sensitivites
around LPP material, the use of vulnerable individuals or juveniles, and CHIS security and
their general welfare. There are certain core documents (the Key Decision Record, the Record
of Contact and the Operational Plan) in which these matters are set out, as well as in the
s.7 submission. We intend to make this area a particular focus of attention in 2018.
Working with liaison partners
11.18
We reviewed the intelligence agencies’ approach to working with other bodies and it is of
particular note in this regard that SIS liaise and work jointly with the intelligence services
of other countries. This liaison is conducted with care, and a premium is placed on local
knowledge and experience, along with the need to react to local events such as political
changes. It is clear that SIS suspend joint work of this kind whenever officers lose confidence
in the safeguards that underpin the engagement and we particularly noted instances when
SIS has temporarily suspended cooperation to safeguard an operation or a CHIS. The Secretary
of State is appropriately appraised of these developments through Ministerial submissions or
letters. However, we observed one occasion when GCHQ shared intelligence with a foreign
partner on the understanding that SIS had a good working relationship with them and that
a s.7 authorisation was in place. In fact, to the contrary, SIS had temporarily suspended both
the engagement and the authorisation, pending assurance as to important matters. While
there is no suggestion that GCHQ acted unlawfully, intelligence was passed without up-to-date
awareness of the reliability of the other body. We have emphasised that SIS must ensure that
they promptly share developments of this kind.
Unwanted material
11.19
During the course of their operations, the intelligence agencies are likely to obtain some
material that does not meet a present or anticipated intelligence requirement. For example,
this could include social material or information relating to a target’s occupation. Operational
requirements develop through the course of an authorisation, which can make it difficult to
predict at the outset any material that will not be of intelligence value. When planning the
operation, the officer must consider this issue carefully as part of the necessity judgement in
relation to the intelligence that is being sought. In some cases, information may unexpectedly
prove to have value as the operation develops. The agency will need to decide whether to
retain all the data, or to delete a portion, in accordance with the data retention policies.
Either approach may be proportionate, depending on the circumstances.
11.20
Each agency has clear policies for handing intelligence that has not been assessed to be of
intelligence value. These policies set out the material they can retain and how, as well as
the length of time for which, it is retained. Because of the complexity of the exercise, these
policies are overlaid by the critical individual assessment of the value of the intelligence
obtained in each case. We suggested that, whenever possible, submissions should include
an outline of the nature of the intelligence that is likely to be obtained, the extent to which
valueless material will be gathered and an explanation as to how it will be handled. It is
necessary for the Secretary of State, particularly with the more wide‑ranging authorisations,
to be given a full understanding of the position.