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IPCO Annual Report 2017
10.5
Part 7 IPA, which came into effect in August 2018, provides for an intelligence agency to
retain a bulk personal dataset if (i) the agency obtains a set of information that includes
personal data relating to a number of individuals; (ii) the nature of the dataset is such
that the majority of the individuals are not, and are unlikely to become, of interest to the
intelligence service in exercising its functions; and (iii) after any initial examination of the
contents to determine whether it is a BPD that is necessary and proportionate for them to
retain, the agency retains the dataset for the purpose of the exercise of its functions, and
the set is held, or is to be held, electronically for analysis in the exercise of those functions.
10.6
Under the IPA, any agency holding any BPD must set out a clear case for its retention, or
retention and examination and ensure protective safeguards are in place to prevent any
misuse. Datasets which contain a substantial proportion of sensitive personal data, as
defined by the Data Protection Act (1998), require additional safeguards. The intelligence
agencies must not hold BPDs for longer than is necessary for the proper exercise of their
functions, under any circumstances.
10.7
The IPA allows the intelligence agencies to apply to retain, or retain and examine, bulk
personal datasets under either a ‘specific’ or ‘class’ warrant. These warrants will be
authorised by the Secretary of State and they require approval by a JC. A class warrants
will describe the class of BPDs to which it relates. Datasets that include health records, or
a substantial proportion of sensitive personal data, cannot be retained, or retained and
examined, under a class warrant, and the agency would have to apply for a specific warrant.
Statistics of use of powers
10.8
We are prevented from giving statistical information about the intelligence agencies’ use
of BPDs in a public document because of the secrecy provisions. The IPC intends to keep
the suggested need for this restriction on publication under review, and in due course this
may form the basis of recommendations to the Prime Minister. The Confidential Annex
to this report gives details about the number of BPDs held and how frequently they have
been accessed.
The authorisation process
10.9
As set out above, the intelligence agencies have developed their own internal procedures
for retention, examination, deletion and internal review.
How IPCO oversees these powers
10.10
In November 2014 the Prime Minister gave direction to the Intelligence Services
Commissioner (ISCom) to oversee the intelligence agencies’ acquisition, retention, use,
disclosure and deletion of BPDs. New provisions under the IPA supplement this direction.
The JCs additionally perform a double‑lock function for new applications to retain, or retain
and examine. BPDs and IPCO will include their use of BPDs in the regular inspections of the
intelligence agencies.
10.11
In 2017, Sir John Goldring led the inspections of BPD at GCHQ, MI5 and SIS (nine inspections).
These were structured as set out below.
10.12
We conducted an initial inspection at each agency in the spring, as part of a general
inspection. Over the summer we undertook specific inspections of BPD sharing. In
December, we held focused inspections of BPD holdings at each agency. This exercise
comprised a random audit of BPD holdings and a review of the data handling processes