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IPCO Annual Report 2017
5.12
Like intrusive surveillance, property interference must be authorised at a higher level
than directed surveillance, for example, by a Chief Constable.29 Written authorisations last
for three months and urgent oral applications for only 72 hours.
5.13
All decisions to authorise, renew or to cancel must be notified to a JC. When the proposed
authorisation relates to property that is a dwelling, hotel bedroom or office or to
information subject to legal professional privilege, confidential personal information such
as medical records or spiritual counselling, the communications of MPs, or confidential
Journalistic material, it must first be approved by a JC before interference can take place.
Intelligence agencies
5.14
A member of the intelligence agencies can apply for a warrant from the Secretary of State.
Applications must contain the same detail as law enforcement applications and they last for
six months. There is no requirement for the intelligence agencies to notify a Commissioner,
nor do these warrants need to be approved by a JC where they relate to sensitive locations
or confidential information.
How IPCO oversees these powers
5.15
IPCO oversees all property interference warrants and authorisations retrospectively. As
explained above, for law enforcement authorisations, a JC is notified of the authorisation
and, in certain circumstances, must approve the activity before it can commence.
Retrospective oversight
5.16
We inspected property interference by police forces and other law enforcement agencies as
part of their annual CHIS and surveillance inspection. In 2017 we conducted 59 inspections
of law enforcement agencies in this regard. At the intelligence agencies we inspected
property interference during the two primary inspections at each agency in 2017.
5.17
The Warrant Granting Departments (WGDs) at the Foreign Office, Home Office and
Northern Ireland Office (NIO) were inspected to assess the gatekeeper role they perform.
This included an assessment of their use of the urgency processes, together with the briefing
notes from senior officials to the Secretaries of State.
5.18
As with other powers, within each organisation the inspectors scrutinised a random
cross‑section of documents, policies and procedures and they interviewed senior
managers, operational and technical staff.
5.19
IPCO seeks to identify any irregularities or examples of poor compliance, most particularly
to prevent them becoming systemic. The number of inspectors and the time they spend
inspecting a public authority varies depending on the use by the authority of its powers,
the complexity of the cases it handles and any compliance concerns.
5.20
It is to be noted in passing that in 2017 we particularly focussed on whether public
authorities had properly considered the potentially significant commercial and technological
impact of operations which may reveal security weaknesses in widely used systems, thereby
creating opportunities for unwarranted interference (colloquially referred to as hacking).
29 Unless urgent, when in this example an Assistant Chief Constable can authorise.