IPCO Annual Report 2017
3.50
There are three areas of particular concern:
• First, the Senior Investigating Officer should not unduly or improperly influence the
routine management of UCs, which should be focussed on the safety of the officer.
The SIO ought not to attempt to dictate the tactical deployment of the CHIS.
• Second, it is evident that, on an excessively frequent basis, forces fail to notify IPCO in a
timely way, or indeed at all, that there has been a new authorisation for an undercover
officer (see statutory instrument 2013/2788).
• Finally, we remain concerned as to how law enforcement interprets the expression
‘same operation’, which determines whether an application for a renewal should be
made to a JC. In many operations, particularly online, an undercover officer will engage
with the same or similarly-minded criminals on more than one occasion, albeit the
contact may last for only a few weeks. The AO needs to consider when the authorisation
is due to expire whether the operation should be continued by way of a renewal or a
new authorisation. We plan to scrutinise this aspect of covert activity closely over the
coming year.
Juvenile CHIS
3.51
The Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Juveniles) Order 2000 and CHIS code of practice
recognise that juveniles are more vulnerable than adults, and makes special provision for
those under 18. Juvenile CHIS must be authorised at a more senior level than adult CHIS, and,
in 2017, renewed monthly.
3.52
If any juvenile CHIS have been deployed by a LEA, the inspectors will consider the detail
of each case.
3.53
Although the circumstances will vary, IPCO inspectors will look at:
• the details of the recruitment of the CHIS, with particular focus on whether the young
person has previously been uninvolved in relevant criminality and is being asked to report
on criminals with whom they would not normally associate. In reality, this never, or only
extremely rarely, occurs;
• the risk assessment and welfare management of the juvenile CHIS, both during the period
authorised and for the period after the deployment (depending on the case, these may be
extensive or they may be limited to ensuring the CHIS understands to contact the Source
Handling Unit if there are any problems);
• the tasking given to the source, focusing particularly on the element of danger and
ensuring the young person is not being asked to mix in criminal circles to which they
would otherwise not have been exposed; and
• whether the parents have been informed and consulted (in some cases sharing this
information with the parents may create a risk to the young person).
3.54
There is detailed focus, therefore, on the duty of care, to ensure that juveniles are not being
put into dangerous situations.
3.55
It is very rare that the intelligence agencies seek to recruit and run juvenile CHIS. We were
satisfied that MI5 handled cases appropriately with authorisations approved at a senior level
and subject to monthly renewal.
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