IPCO Annual Report 2017
The Intelligence Agencies and the MOD
3.33
The intelligence agencies and the MOD, generally speaking, properly authorised CHIS
activity during the period covered by this report. In one case that was inspected,
albeit the event occurred prior to the period under review, MI5 failed to obtain a RIPA
authorisation for a limited amount of activity in the UK (this was part of a larger, mostly
overseas‑based operation). On a few occasions SIS mistakenly failed to obtain appropriate
CHIS authorisations when meeting covert human intelligence sources or conducting other
CHIS-related activity in the UK. To prevent similar errors in the future, SIS has implemented
mandatory legal and compliance training for all officers (valid for two years) and refresher
training for officers returning from overseas. We will monitor this programme closely.
3.34
The intelligence agencies and MOD pay close regard to the welfare of their human
intelligence sources, albeit – as with law enforcement – we found instances when rehearsing
out-of-date information risked confusing an assessment of present risk.
3.35
At MI5 each case is reviewed by a dedicated operational security officer, who is independent
of the case handler and the AO. MI5 uses its Behavioural Science Unit to support those
human intelligence sources with particularly challenging welfare issues.
3.36
We were briefed by MI5 on one CHIS case in which role-players were in contact with a
‘subject of interest’ who was experiencing particularly difficult personal circumstances. The
human intelligence and source-running section consulted the MI5 Ethics Counsellor at an
early stage in the planning process and the counsellor helped shape the operational plan in
order to minimise the emotional impact of the operation. This history was well documented
in the relevant authorisations and the high level of intrusion in this case was clearly justified
by the threat to national security posed by this individual.
3.37
The MOD recently started using online CHIS and this has been inspected by IPCO. We are
content with their approach and we are currently reviewing their recently introduced
internal guidance.
3.38
It is particularly evident that the intelligence agencies and the MOD manage CHIS cases
with detailed regard for necessity and proportionality: (i) in complex cases; (ii) whenever
there were significant concerns around a CHIS’s security and welfare; and (iii) in cases
involving significant levels of intrusion (e.g. those involving access to confidential material).
By way of contrast, these issues were often insufficiently addressed in the more routine
applications. This is an area for improvement.
3.39
We also also recommended that GCHQ review its CHIS application and renewal template
to ensure they record greater detail in the fields relating to necessity, proportionality and
collateral intrusion, and that they provide improved guidance on intrusion and personal
information. We recommended that the MOD maintains an up-to-date record of intrusion
into the lives of the family members of a CHIS.
3.40
In a similar vein, MI5 needs to improve how it considers collateral intrusion. Assessments
can appear formulaic, with the same wording being applied in different contexts. To reach a
useful assessment, officers need to have an in-depth knowledge of the CHIS and they should
assess the particular ways in which the individual may gather intelligence. Highly relevant in
this context are the sources of the CHIS, together with the locations and the context in which
he or she works. We recommended that MI5 improves how collateral intrusion is addressed
in the authorisation paperwork, and that staff understand the need to set out relevant
collateral intrusion information on the CHIS forms, including for renewals.
19